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NOTE
DISCARDING THE NORTH DAKOTA DICTUM:
AN ARGUMENT FOR STRICT SCRUTINY OF THE
THREE-TIER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
Amy Murphy*
In Granholm v. Heald, the Supreme Court held that states must treat in-
state and out-of-state alcoholic beverages equally under the dormant
Commerce Clause and established a heightened standard of review for
state alcohol laws. Yet in dictum the Court acknowledged that the three-tier
distribution system--a regime that imposes a physical presence requirement
on alcoholic beverage wholesalers and retailers-was "unquestionably legit-
imate." Though the system's physical presence requirement should trigger
strict scrutiny, lower courts have placed special emphasis on Granholm's
dictum, refusing to subject the three-tier distribution system to Granholm's
heightened standard of review. This Note argues that the dictum should be
discarded and that courts should carefully scrutinize the three-tier distri-
bution system. Under Granholm's heightened standard of review, the
three-tier distribution system would be found unconstitutional.
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INTRODUCTION
From 1920 until 1933, the United States prohibited the manufacture,
transportation, and sale of alcohol. In spite of this constitutional mandate,
people went to great lengths to obtain alcohol. In turn, the federal govern-
ment went to even greater lengths to enforce Prohibition. In one memorable
example, the Coolidge Administration initiated a poisoning program, aimed
at deterring citizens from drinking.' Soon after Prohibition began, criminal
syndicates started stealing industrial alcohol, which is not intended for hu-
man consumption, and selling it to American citizens. The federal
government ordered manufacturers to incorporate toxic chemicals such as
methyl in the alcohol to render it undrinkable. Undeterred, the syndicates
hired chemists to "renature" the alcohol, returning it to its semi-potable, and
thus marketable, state.' The government again upped the ante, adding more
potent levels of chemicals, such as gasoline, mercury salts, ether, and for-
maldehyde, to the alcohol. The problem with this poisoning program, which
lasted through the repeal of Prohibition in 1933, was that it failed to achieve
its purpose: people kept drinking the alcohol, even when it made them fatal-
ly ill. By Prohibition's end, an estimated 10,000 people had died from
poisoned industrial alcohol.3
Prohibition era stories such as the federal poisoning program reveal our
country's uneasy approach to alcohol regulation. Though the failed experi-
ment of Prohibition is one of the United States' distant memories, vestiges
of that era persist in alcohol laws around the country that make the retail
sale of alcohol an overly complicated and burdensome process. The three-
tier distribution system, which is the most common regulatory system in the
United States, is a prime example of the country's rigorous approach to al-
cohol regulation.
Because the three-tier system was a reaction to Prohibition, 4 a brief
background on the Prohibition Amendment and its repeal is important to
understanding the current state of alcohol regulation. In 1919, Congress rati-
1. Deborah Blum, The Chemist's War: The Little-Told Story of How the U.S. Govern-




4. FED. TRADE COMM'N, POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO -COMMERCE:
WINE 5-6 (2003), available at http://ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf [hereinafter FTC
REPORT].
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fled the Eighteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, prohibit-
ing the manufacture, sale, or transportation of "intoxicating liquors."5 By
1933, thirteen years of syndicate-dominated bootlegging, bathtub gin, and
speakeasies had led one outspoken proponent of Prohibition, John D. Rock-
efeller, Jr., to abandon his position. In a letter to the president of Columbia
University, which was subsequently published by the New York Times on
June 7, 1932, Rockefeller acknowledged, "[Prohibition's] benefits, im-
portant and far reaching as they are, are more than outweighed by the evils
that have developed and flourished since its adoption ...."6 Congress
agreed and enacted the Twenty-First Amendment on December 5, 1933.
The first section of the Twenty-First Amendment ("Section One")
accomplished the goal of erasing the Eighteenth Amendment.7 The lesser-
known, second section of the Twenty-First Amendment ("Section Two")
prohibits the transportation of alcohol into a state in violation of that state's
laws.' Section Two represents a compromise. Proponents of Prohibition's
repeal aimed to diminish organized crime, which had flourished during
Prohibition, and to generate new tax revenue, which would aid states that
were experiencing diminished revenues during the Great Depression. 9
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI ("After one
year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating
liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States
and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibit-
ed.").
6. RAYMOND B. FOSDICK, JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, JR.: A PORTRAIT 256 (1956). Daniel
Okrent notes, however, that just three years earlier the author of the Eighteenth Amendment,
Senator Morris Sheppard, still advocated Prohibition, saying, "There is as much chance of
repealing the Eighteenth Amendment as there is for a hummingbird to fly to the planet Mars
with the Washington Monument tied to its tail." DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE RISE AND
FALL OF PROHIBITION 330 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Okrent comments that
"[it is] a measure of how badly Prohibition had failed that the Twenty-First Amendment-the
repeal amendment-was ratified just three years [after Sheppard's statement]." Interview by
Stephen J. Dubner with Daniel Okrent, What Prohibition Can Teach Us About Marijuana
Legalization, FREAKONOMICS BLOG (Aug. 4, 2010, 11:30 AM), http://freakonomics.blogs.
nytimes.con2010/08/04/what-can-prohibition-teach-us-about-marijuana-legalization-and-
other-tales-from-last-call-author-daniel-okrent/.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § I ("The eighteenth article of amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States is hereby repealed."). People who celebrate the Twenty-First
Amendment are probably reveling in Section One. See, e.g., Allen Katz, Now Toasting: Happy
Repeal Day!, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Dec. 5, 2008, 12:36 PM), http://tmagazine.blogs.
nytimes.com/2008/12/05/now-toasting-happy-repeal-day/.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 ("The transportation or importation into any State,
Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors,
in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."). For a recognition of the paradox of
Section Two's prohibition on certain private conduct, see Laurence H. Tribe, How To Violate
the Constitution Without Really Trying: Lessons from the Repeal of Prohibition to the Bal-
anced Budget Amendment, 12 CONST. COMMENT 217, 219 (1995) ("To repeat, Section 2 of the
Twenty-first Amendment directly prohibits-talk about prohibition!!-the conduct that it was
apparently meant to authorize the States to prohibit ....").
9. OKRENT, supra note 6, at 329-55 (describing various motivations for the enactment
of the Twenty-First Amendment).
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Meanwhile, Congress wanted to grant states the power to structure orderly
markets for the sale of alcohol while preserving the option for states to be
dry.'0
The majority of states have used their Section Two powers to impose the
three-tier system as their regulatory scheme." This system organizes the
actors involved in alcohol's distribution (producers, wholesalers, and retail-
ers) into three tiers and imposes different licensing requirements on them.'2
The three-tier system also requires that wholesalers and retailers have a
physical presence in the state in order to sell in state.' 3
Some courts have found that state alcohol laws within the three-tier sys-
tem discriminate against interstate commerce, violating the dormant
Commerce Clause. 14 The latest word from the Supreme Court came in
Granholm v. Heald, in which the Court announced that state alcohol regula-
tions are constitutional when they treat in-state and out-of-state alcoholic
beverages equally.'5 Yet in that same decision the Court stated in dictum that
it had "previously recognized that the three-tier system itself is 'unquestion-
ably legitimate.' 116 This assertion seemingly contradicts Granholm's rule
because the three-tier system necessarily excludes out-of-state wholesalers
and retailers from participating in a state's alcoholic beverage market. '7
10. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 484 (2005) ("The aim of the Twenty-first
amendment was to allow States to maintain an effective and uniform system for controlling
liquor by regulating its transportation, importation, and use."); RAYMOND B. FOSDICK & AL-
BERT L. SCOTT, TOWARD LIQUOR CONTROL 18, 53 (Harper 1933). For a brief analysis of the
disputed legislative history of Section Two, see infra note 39.
11. See Comprehensive Alcohol Regulatory Effectiveness (CARE) Act of 2010: Hearing
on H.R. 5034 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111 th Cong. 139 (2010) (prepared state-
ment of Tracy K. Genesen, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, on behalf of The Wine Institute) [hereinafter
Hearing on H.R. 5034]; FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 5.
12. See infra notes 22-32 and accompanying text for a more detailed presentation of
the three-tier system's structure.
13. See infra notes 26-30.
14. See, e.g., Granholm, 544 U.S. 460 (striking down state laws that denied out-of-state
wineries direct shipment privileges while granting in-state wineries that privilege); Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. Schnorf, 738 F. Supp. 2d 793 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (deeming unconstitutional a law
prohibiting out-of-state brewers from obtaining distributors' licenses to function as wholesal-
ers within the state of Illinois).
15. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489 ("State policies are protected under the Twenty-first
Amendment when they treat liquor produced out of state the same as its domestic equiva-
lent.").
16. Id. (citing North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990) (plurality opin-
ion)).
17. See infra notes 22-32 and accompanying text. Though a few scholars have recently
considered this proposition, see, e.g., Kevin C. Quigley, Note, Uncorking Granholm: Extend-
ing the Nondiscrimination Principle to All Interstate Commerce in Wine, 52 B.C. L. REV.
1871 (2011), none has considered the importance of the North Dakota dictum or challenged
its application in the dormant Commerce Clause context.
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Lower courts have reiterated this dictum, which this Note calls "the
North Dakota dictum"'" in recognition of the case from which it was quot-
ed, in a number of cases in which out-of-state retailers have contended that
they should be able to ship to consumers just as their in-state counterparts
can. All courts but one have used the North Dakota dictum to dispose of
these retailer challenges, shielding the three-tier system from the judicial
review mandated in Granholm 9 Relying on the dictum, courts treat the
three-tier system as sacrosanct.
This Note argues that the North Dakota dictum should not shield the
three-tier system from the heightened judicial review mandated in
Granholm. Part I outlines the structure of the three-tier system and explains
the interplay of the Twenty-First Amendment and the dormant Commerce
Clause in the Granholm decision. Part I also introduces the cases that have
relied on the North Dakota dictum to foreclose judicial review of the three-
tier system, as well as the one district court decision that discarded the dic-
tum to reach a different conclusion. Part II argues that the application of the
North Dakota dictum to retailers' dormant Commerce Clause challenges is
amiss because North Dakota relied on abrogated Supreme Court opinions,
which held that the Twenty-First Amendment immunized state alcohol regu-
lations from the limitations of the Commerce Clause. Part III predicts that if
the three-tier system were subjected to more rigorous scrutiny, courts would
likely find that the three-tier system violates the dormant Commerce Clause
and Granholm's mandate that states treat in-state and out-of-state alcoholic
beverages equally.
I. GRANHOLM V HEALD: THE HOLDING AND THE DICTUM
This Part analyzes Granholm's essential mandate and the operation of
the North Dakota dictum. Section I.A presents the structure of the three-tier
system. Section I.B then outlines the conflicting treatment of state alcohol
laws under dormant Commerce Clause challenges, which led the Granholm
Court to clarify that the Twenty-First Amendment does not shield discrimi-
natory state laws from constitutional challenge. Finally, Section I.C
introduces the cases involving retailer challenges to the three-tier system,
which illustrate the shielding function of the North Dakota dictum.
18. The dictum originates in another Supreme Court decision, North Dakota v. United
States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990), which this Note analyzes in more depth in Sections II.A-.B.
19. Compare Wine Country Gift Baskets.corn v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809 (5th Cir. 2010)
(finding no dormant Commerce Clause violation where the three-tier system barred out-of-
state retailers from selling and shipping directly to in-state consumers), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 1602 (2011), Arnold's Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2009) (same), and
Brooks v. Vassar, 462 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding no discrimination where the three-tier
system allowed consumers to personally import one gallon of wine or beer outside the three-
tier system but established no limit on the amount of alcohol purchased through the three-tier
system), with Siesta Vill. Mkt., LLC v. Granholm, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1039 (E.D. Mich.




A. The Three-Tier System
In order to understand Granholm's mandate, it is crucial first to outline
the structure of the three-tier system. States that regulate their alcoholic
beverage markets through the three-tier system allow private retailers and
distributors to sell alcohol to consumers. By contrast, a minority of states
follow a "control model," in which the state monopolizes the retail sale and,
in some cases, the distribution of alcohol.2" This Note focuses only on those
states that rely on the three-tier system.2
Through a "complex set of overlapping state and federal regulations, 2
the three-tier system excludes out-of-state wholesalers and retailers from
participating in a state's alcoholic beverage market.23 The first tier of the
system consists of the producers of alcohol-wineries, distilleries, and
breweries.24 Any individual or entity wishing to sell alcohol in the United
States must apply for a basic permit from the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and
Trade Bureau.25 After obtaining the permit, the producer may sell its prod-
ucts to any wholesaler that is located in the state and has obtained a state
license to distribute alcohol.2 6 This licensed, in-state wholesaler is a member
of the second tier.27 The wholesaler purchases alcohol products from various
producers, keeps records on its purchases, and pays excise taxes to the
state.28 Then, the wholesaler sells its alcohol products to retailers, the third
tier of the system.29 Like wholesalers, retailers must be licensed and retain a
20. Three-Tier Distribution System, S. WINE & SPIRITS, http://www.southemwine.com/
AboutSWS/SWS3Tier/tabid!98/Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
21. Id.
22. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460,466 (2005).
23. See, e.g., id. at 469-70 (explaining that Michigan's and New York's three-tier sys-
tems required wineries to sell their products to in-state wholesalers); Christopher G. Sparks,
Comment, Out-of-State Wine Retailers Corked: How the Illinois General Assembly Limits
Direct Wine Shipments from Out-of-State Retailers to Illinois Oenophiles and Why the Com-
merce Clause Will Not Protect Them, 30 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 481, 502-03 (2010) (describing
Illinois's three-tier scheme as mandating that all producers of alcohol distribute to in-state
wholesalers and all in-state wholesalers sell to in-state retailers, which are the only entities
within the system that may sell and ship directly to consumers).
24. See FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 5.
25. Id.
26. See id. For example, Michigan law requires an individual seeking a wholesaler
license to have resided in Michigan for at least one year. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1601(1)
(2011). The wholesaler may then operate at a licensed premises located in the state of Michi-
gan. MICH. LIQUOR CONTROL COMM'N, DEP'T OF LICENSING & REGULATORY AFFAIRS,
MICHIGAN WHOLESALE LICENSE REQUIREMENTS AND GENERAL INFORMATION (2011), avail-
able at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/cis/Wholesaler 182943_7.pdf.
27. See FrC REPORT, supra note 4, at 5.
28. C. Boyden Gray, Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of Am., Summary Position Paper
Prepared for the Federal Trade Commission Workshop on the Possible Anticompetitive Efforts
To Restrict Competition on the Internet, FED. TRADE COMMISSION 2 (Oct. 8, 2002),
www.ftc.gov/opp/ecommerce/anticompetitive/panel/gray.pdf.
29. See FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 5.
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location within the state.30 Once the alcoholic beverages reach the third tier,
consumers may purchase them from retail stores, which collect applicable
sales taxes and transfer those taxes to the state. 31 In most cases, both federal
and state laws prevent any entity within the three-tier system from occupy-
ing more than one tier, which is known as a limit on vertical integration.32
Producers, consumers, and retailers have all raised complaints about the
three-tier system. Alcoholic beverage producers have trouble accessing par-
ticular state markets because the number of producers overwhelms the
number of licensed wholesalers distributing within that state.33 Small winer-
ies, in particular, claim that they are shut out of many markets because
wholesalers tend to limit their purchases to wines produced only by the
largest wineries.3 4 These same dynamics affect consumers, who demand a
greater variety of alcoholic beverages in their retail stores. 35 Finally, retailers
argue that they should be allowed to ship directly to out-of-state consumers,
bypassing the in-state wholesaler (the second tier of the system).36 Retailers
note that while mail-order catalogues and the internet allow businesses to
ship most goods across the country, America's alcohol laws prevent such
ease in the shipment of alcoholic beverages.3 7
30. Id.; see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1305.
31. Arnold's Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 187 (2d Cir. 2009); Gray, supra note
28, at 2.
32. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466 (2005) (citing 27 U.S.C. § 205, the prohibi-
tion on "tied houses"); FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 5. Tied houses were saloons that
exclusively sold the products of one brewer; they were popular around the turn of twentieth
century and quite profitable for participating retailers and producers. OKRENT, supra note 6, at
29-30. The three-tier system's ban on vertical integration was meant to counteract the poten-
tial resurgence of tied houses after the repeal of Prohibition. See, e.g., Cal. Beer Wholesalers
Ass'n v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 487 P.2d 745, 748 (Cal. 1971).
33. Hearing on H.R. 5034, supra note 11, at 137 (prepared statement of Tracy K. Gen-
esen, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, on behalf of The Wine Institute) ("[C]onsiderable consolidation
has occurred in the wholesale tier in recent years[, which] means the vast majority of wineries
face an increasingly narrow gauntlet of wholesalers."); FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 6.
34. David Sloane, Am. Vintners Ass'n, Summary Statement Prepared for the Federal
Trade Commission Workshop on the Possible Anticompetitive Efforts To Restrict Competition on
the Internet, FED. TRADE COMMISSION 2 (Oct. 8, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ecommerce/
anticompetitive/panel/sloane.pdf; see also Hearing on H.R. 5034, supra note 11, at 137 (prepared
statement of Tracy K. Genesen, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, on behalf of The Wine Institute)
("[W]holesalers tend to focus almost exclusively on the well-known, high-volume wines to the
exclusion of the smaller, lesser-known brands.").
35. See FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 3-4.
36. E.g., Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809 (5th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011); Arnold's Wines, 571 F.3d 185; Brooks v. Vassar, 462 F.3d 341
(4th Cir. 2006); Siesta Vill. Mkt., LLC. v. Granholm, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1039 (E.D. Mich.
2008).
37. For example, one retailer described alcohol laws as follows:
Unfortunately, as a mail order company, we can't help you on the alcohol side of the
equation. I'd be less likely to go to jail if I shipped you a case of crack or a wheelbarrow




B. The Interaction between the Twenty-First Amendment
and the Dormant Commerce Clause
Section Two of the Twenty-First Amendment authorizes the states to
create alcohol distribution systems such as the three-tier system.3" The Su-
preme Court has held, however, that this grant of power to the states does
not immunize state laws from other constitutional restrictions.39 Relevant to
this Note, state alcohol laws must accord with the dormant Commerce
Clause,4° a negative constraint inferred from the Commerce Clause that pre-
vents states from enacting and enforcing laws that burden interstate
commerce .
41
Immediately after Prohibition's repeal, the Supreme Court granted states
wide latitude to regulate alcohol, holding that Section Two authorized dis-
criminatory state alcohol regulations.42 In these early decisions the Supreme
Court interpreted the Twenty-First Amendment as saving state statutes that
would otherwise violate the dormant Commerce Clause.43 But in subsequent
decisions, the Court reversed its earlier stance and concluded that the Twen-
Mo Frechette, Cocktails: Ingredient Assistance, ZINGERMAN'S FALL BUYERS GUIDE (Zinger-
man's Delicatessen, Ann Arbor, Mich.), Fall 2010, at 52.
38. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 488 (2005) (citing Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980)).
39. Id. at 484-87 (citing cases finding that the Twenty-First Amendment does not im-
munize state alcohol laws from the First Amendment, the Establishment Clause, the Equal
Protection Clause, or the Import-Export Clause). Historically, there have been two competing
views regarding the legislative intent of Section Two. One scholar has titled them the "absolut-
ist" and "federalist" views. Absolutists interpret Section Two as a plenary grant of authority to
regulate alcohol to the states, free of any external constitutional restrictions. David S. Versfelt,
Note and Comment, The Effect of the Twenty-First Amendment on State Authority To Control
Intoxicating Liquors, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1578, 1579-80 (1975). Federalists, on the other
hand, argue that Section Two was designed to give states the choice to be dry as well as to
encourage "federal oversight" of state alcohol laws. Id. Because the Supreme Court explicitly
found that the Constitution restricts the Twenty-First Amendment in Granholm, this debate
over legislative intent should have little impact on current litigation.
40. See, e.g., Arnold's Wines, 571 F.3d at 191 ("While the Twenty-first Amendment
grants the states broad powers to regulate the transportation, sale, and use of alcohol within
their borders, it simply does not immunize attempts to discriminate in favor of local products
and producers."); Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Schnorf, 738 F Supp. 2d 793, 802 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
41. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,
338 (2007) ("Although the Constitution does not in terms limit the power of States to regulate
commerce, we have long interpreted the Commerce Clause as an implicit restraint on state
authority, even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute."); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Pref-
erences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1705 (1984) ("The commerce clause
is both an authorization to Congress and, more controversially, a self-executing prohibition on
certain state actions burdening interstate commerce-the so-called 'dormant' commerce
clause." (footnotes omitted)).
42. See, e.g., Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395, 398 (1939) ("Since
[enactment of the Twenty-First] amendment, the right of a State to prohibit or regulate the
importation of intoxicating liquor is not limited by the commerce clause."), abrogated by
Granholn, 544 U.S. 460; State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62
(1936), abrogated by Granholm, 544 U.S. 460.
43. See, e.g., McKittrick, 305 U.S. at 398.
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ty-First Amendment does not trump the dormant Commerce Clause or other
constitutional provisions."
In 2005, the Supreme Court finally resolved whether Section Two blocks
Commerce Clause challenges to state alcohol laws. In Granholm v. Heald,
small wineries challenged the alcohol laws of Michigan and New York.
4 5
Both states' alcohol industries operate under the three-tier system, and both
states had enacted laws granting in-state wineries a method of bypassing the
system while denying that privilege to out-of-state wineries. 46 In Michigan,
the challenged law required all wineries to distribute their wine through
licensed wholesalers located in Michigan, except that approximately forty
in-state wineries could ship directly to consumers. 47 While an in-state
winery could qualify for the exception, an out-of-state winery wanting to
introduce its wine into the Michigan market could only do so by transferring
its products through the three-tier system.
41
New York's scheme differed from Michigan's, but had a similar effect.
49
As in Michigan, New York required all wineries to funnel alcohol into the
state through New York wholesalers." However, New York granted an ex-
emption to wineries that wanted to ship wines produced predominantly from
New York grapes." This exemption included out-of-state wineries only if
they established a location within the state of New York.52 Though New
York's law was not a patent prohibition like Michigan's, the Court recog-
nized that New York's physical presence requirement might make direct
shipment of wine impractical.5 3
Michigan and New York argued that Section Two saved their regulations
from constitutional scrutiny.5 4 But the Granholm Court analyzed the varying
case law55 and then followed more modem precedents in deciding that state
alcohol regulations are subject to constitutional restrictions. 6 State alcohol
laws, therefore, must abide by the dormant Commerce Clause or, as the
44. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204-05 (1976) ("[T]he Twenty-first
Amendment does not save the invidious gender-based discrimination from invalidation as a
denial of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Hostetter
v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332 (1964) ("Both the Twenty-first
Amendment and the Commerce Clause are parts of the same Constitution. Like other provi-
sions of the Constitution, each must be considered in the light of the other, and in the context
of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case.").
45. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 465-68 (2005).
46. Id. at 466-67.
47. Id. at 469.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 466.
50. See id. at 470.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 466.
54. Id. at 476.
55. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
56. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476-81, 486-87.
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Court referred to it, "the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce
Clause."57
In Granholm, the Court issued a new rule (the "equal treatment rule"):
state alcohol laws are constitutional when they treat in-state and out-of-state
alcoholic beverages equally.58 Because the laws of New York and Michigan
involved "straightforward attempts to discriminate in favor of local produc-
ers," the laws violated the dormant Commerce Clause.5 9
This holding, however, did not end the inquiry. The Court established a
two-part standard of review for determining the constitutional validity of
state alcohol laws.6" After finding the Michigan and New York laws discrim-
inatory, the Court determined whether the states' alcohol laws "advance[d] a
legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives."61 At this point in the analysis, a state must
meet a heavy burden.6" First, the state must show that the challenged alcohol
law promotes at least one of a discrete set of local purposes. 63 Second, the
state must explain with concrete evidence why nondiscriminatory laws
could not advance those purposes.64 Throughout this Note, this heightened
standard of review outlined by the Granholm Court is referred to as strict
scrutiny. 65
Granholm dismantled the challenged Michigan and New York laws be-
cause the Court found the states' arguments insufficient to justify the
discriminatory treatment of out-of-state wineries. 66 Michigan and New York
had asserted that their laws kept alcohol out of the hands of minors, facili-
tated tax collection, protected public health and safety, and ensured
regulatory accountability.67 The Court recognized all of these local purposes
57. Id. at 487.
58. Id. at 489 ("State policies are protected under the Twenty-first Amendment when
they treat liquor produced out of state the same as its domestic equivalent.").
59. Id.
60. Id. at 488-93.
61. Id. at 489 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
62. See infra Section I1I.A and, in particular, note 154.
63. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489-90.
64. Id. at 492-93.
65. Strict scrutiny in the context of the dormant Commerce Clause is distinct from the
more familiar strict scrutiny test that applies in a Fourteenth Amendment analysis. See, e.g.,
Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) ("Under the resulting protocol for
dormant Commerce Clause analysis, we ask whether a challenged law discriminates against
interstate commerce. A discriminatory law is virtually per se invalid, and will survive only if it
advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondis-
criminatory alternatives." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
66. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492.
67. Id. at 489-93.
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as legitimate.6 8 However, the Court also reasoned that Michigan and New
York could use less restrictive means to achieve these goals, such as requir-
ing an adult signature to make delivery of alcohol and instituting direct
shipment permits for monitoring and taxing alcohol purchases.6
But what about the three-tier system? In brief dictum the Court
acknowledged that the three-tier system is "unquestionably legitimate. 70
However, Justice Stevens, dissenting in Granholm, recognized that the
three-tier system gives discriminatory preference to in-state retailers and
wholesalers. 71 In fact, the structure of the three-tier system necessarily ex-
cludes out-of-state wholesalers and out-of-state retailers unless they
establish a physical presence in the state.72 By design, then, the three-tier
system not only prefers in-state entities at the second and third tiers but also
allows only those in-state entities to compete in the state's alcoholic bever-
age market. Granholm's essential mandate-treat in-state and out-of-state
alcohol equally-calls into question the lawfulness of the three-tier system.
C. Retailer Challenges to the Three-Tier System
In the wake of Granholm several retailers challenged three-tier system
laws, but most courts have upheld those laws, using the North Dakota dic-
tum to circumvent Granholm's standard of review. In Arnold's Wines v.
Boyle, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a provision of
New York's Alcoholic Beverage Code that prohibited out-of-state wine re-
tailers from selling and shipping directly to New York citizens. 3 The
plaintiffs in Arnold's Wines claimed that this part of New York's three-tier
system violated the dormant Commerce Clause because it "grants in-state
retailers benefits not afforded to out-of-state retailers. ' 74 In response, the
appellate court noted that this challenge was a "frontal attack"75 on the
three-tier system and that the Granholm Court had recognized the three-tier
system's "vital role ... in the exercise of states' section 2 powers. '76 The
68. Id. Other courts have recognized the promotion of temperance and the establish-
ment of orderly market conditions as legitimate local purposes. See, e.g., North Dakota v.
United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990) (plurality opinion).
69. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 490-93.
70. Id. at 489 ("We have previously recognized that the three-tier system itself is 'un-
questionably legitimate.'" (quoting North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432)).
71. See id. at 494 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The New York and Michigan laws ...
would be patently invalid under well-settled dormant Commerce Clause principles if they
regulated sales of an ordinary article of commerce rather than wine"); accord Sparks, supra
note 23, at 503 ("The three-tier system-by definition and necessity-burdens interstate
commerce.").
72. See supra notes 26-30. For an analysis of the constitutionality of a physical pres-
ence requirement, see infra Section Ill.B. 1.
73. 571 F.3d 185, 186 (2d Cir. 2009).





court deemed the retailers' challenge foreclosed by the North Dakota dic-
tum,77 stating that "if dicta this be, it is of the most persuasive kind. 78
In two other retailer challenges, the North Dakota dictum similarly
shielded the three-tier system from the judicial review otherwise mandated
in Granholm. In Brooks v. Vassar, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit upheld a personal import exception in Virginia's Alcoholic Beverage
Code, which allowed Virginians to import one gallon or four liters of out-of-
state wine into Virginia without that alcohol having to pass through the
state's three-tier system.7 9 The plaintiffs' argument centered around the
three-tier system's prohibition on out-of-state retailers, which cannot oper-
ate in Virginia's alcoholic beverage market unless they establish an in-state
presence. 80 Like the Second Circuit, the Fourth Circuit sensed that this claim
amounted to a frontal attack on the three-tier system. Accordingly, the court
reasoned that "an argument that compares the status of an in-state retailer
with an out-of-state retailer ... is nothing different than an argument chal-
lenging the three-tier system itself." 8 Because the Granholm Court
endorsed the system, the North Dakota dictum foreclosed judicial review.8 2
Finally, in Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reviewed provisions of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage
Code that allowed in-state retailers to make local alcoholic beverage deliver-
ies but prohibited out-of-state retailers from selling and directly shipping to
Texas consumers. 83 The appellate court decided these provisions were
constitutional.84 Though the court recognized that Granholm mandates a
two-part standard of review for state alcohol laws, it found that level of re-
view inapplicable to the retailers' challenge because the three-tier system's
structure, the court stated, is a priori constitutional. 85 Further, the Wine
Country court found that the "compelling"8 6 North Dakota dictum shielded
the three-tier system from Granholm's judicial review. 87 In the end, the court
77. Id. at 190-91 (explaining that the "[a]ppellants' argument is therefore directly fore-
closed by the Granholm Court's express affirmation of the legality of the three-tier system").
The Arnold's Wines court also advanced an argument that the three-tier system accords with
Granholin's equal treatment rule, a counterargument that this Note takes up infra in Section
III.B.3.
78. Arnold's Wines, 571 F.3d at 191 (quoting Arnold's Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F.
Supp. 2d 401,412 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. 462 F.3d 341, 354 (4th Cir. 2006).
80. Brooks, 462 F.3d at 352.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. 612 F.3d 809 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011).
84. Wine Country, 612 F.3d at 821.
85. Id. at 820 ("When analyzing whether a State's alcoholic beverage regulation dis-
criminates under the dormant Commerce Clause, a beginning premise is that wholesalers and
retailers may be required to be within the State.").
86. Id. at 816.
87. See id. at 819 ("Each tier is authorized by Texas law and approved by the Twenty-
first Amendment-so says Granholm-to do what producers, wholesalers, and retailers do.").
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found no discrimination in Texas's three-tier system because the challenged
law was a "constitutionally benign incident" 88 of a lawful system, even
though the three-tier system entailed discrimination.
89
Despite these three appellate court decisions, at least one court has
found Granholm's essential mandate at odds with its endorsement of the
three-tier system. In Siesta Village Market, LLC v. Granholm, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan struck down a Michigan law that
prohibited out-of-state retailers from directly shipping alcoholic beverages
to consumers in Michigan.9 The state of Michigan argued that the Twenty-
First Amendment gave it authority to establish the three-tier system.91 Refer-
ring to the North Dakota dictum, the court in Siesta Village rejected
Michigan's argument and explained that though "the [Granholm] [C]ourt
did state that the three-tier system was an appropriate use of state power, it
did not approve of a system that discriminates against out-of-state inter-
ests. '92 This contradiction between Granholm's equal treatment rule and its
"unquestionably legitimate" 93 dictum led the court in Siesta Village to dis-
card the dictum. 94
After the district court determined that the North Dakota dictum did not
apply to this retailer challenge, it performed the judicial review mandated in
Granholm and found Michigan's prohibition on out-of-state retailers uncon-
stitutional. 95 Michigan's law, the court reasoned, gave in-state retailers a
privilege otherwise denied to their out-of-state counterparts, who could ac-
cess the Michigan alcoholic beverage market only by opening a location in
Michigan and obtaining a retailer's license from the state of Michigan. 96
These requirements imposed an extra burden on foreign retailers.97 Thus, the
court found this part of the three-tier scheme to be discriminatory for its
differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state retailers.98 After this prima-
ry holding, the court performed the second part of the Granholm test and
found that Michigan had not met its burden of producing clear evidence that
nondiscriminatory alternatives would fail to promote the state's local pur-
poses. 99 Because Siesta Village was decided in the years following
Granholm (a Michigan case), the court could point to the current direct
88. Id. at 820.
89. Id. at 818 ("Such discrimination-among producers-is not the question today ....
[The three-tier system] has been given constitutional approval.").
90. 596 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1044-45 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
91. Siesta Vill., 596 F. Supp. 2d at 1039.
92. Id.
93. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005) (quoting North Dakota v. United
States, 495 U.S. 423,432 (1990) (plurality opinion)).
94. Siesta Viii., 596 F. Supp. 2d at 1039.
95. See id. at 1039-45.
96. Id. at 1040.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1039-40.
99. Id. at 1041-44.
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shipment scheme for wineries-a scheme the state of Michigan instituted in
reaction to the Granholm holding-as proof that a reasonable, nondiscrimi-
natory alternative to the three-tier system could satisfy Michigan's
administrative needs.1°
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE NORTH DAKOTA DICTUM
These four retailer challenges to the three-tier system illustrate the North
Dakota dictum's shielding function. Once a court invokes the dictum, the
three-tier system is saved from strict scrutiny. But when the Eastern District
of Michigan disregarded the dictum in Siesta Village, the state alcohol law
fell as a result."10 This shielding function, therefore, begs a question: Why is
the three-tier system unquestionably legitimate?
Granholm itself does not provide any kind of answer. The Supreme
Court only briefly mentioned the system's previously recognized legitimacy
before moving on to pronounce the equal treatment rule. 02 An answer to
this question requires more in-depth analysis of the dictum itself, originating
in an earlier Supreme Court decision, North Dakota v. United States.103 Sec-
tion II.A examines the Supreme Court decision in North Dakota,
particularly the sentence that has become the North Dakota dictum, for its
relevance to dormant Commerce Clause challenges. Then, Section II.B con-
tends that because the decision in North Dakota rests on law abrogated or
overruled by Granholm, its dictum should not apply to the retailers' dormant
Commerce Clause cases. Section II.C addresses the Fifth Circuit's counter-
argument that the three-tier system is a caveat to the equal treatment rule.
That argument is at odds with Granholm's text and central mandate for
heightened review of discriminatory alcohol regulations.
A. The Constitutional Challenge in North Dakota v. United States
In North Dakota v. United States, the Supreme Court heard a challenge
by the federal government to a North Dakota statute. This law mandated that
out-of-state alcohol producers affix a label to products intended for sale at
military bases within the state and comply with the state's monthly reporting
requirements.' °4 On two military bases, which were controlled by the state
and federal governments concurrently, the Department of Defense ("DOD")
100. The District Court stated as follows:
The State does not suggest any alternatives for regulating wine from out-of-state retailers
nor make any showing that such an alternative is unworkable. The State also entertains
no discussion about how it regulates wine shipped directly from out-of-state wineries and
why the same procedures would be unworkable in regulating shipments from out-of-state
retailers.
Id. at 1041.
101. See 596 F. Supp. 2d 1035.
102. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005).
103. 495 U.S. 423 (1990) (plurality opinion).
104. North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 426.
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operated clubs and package stores that sold alcohol to military personnel
and their families. 05 In order to reduce its prices, the DOD had established a
competitive bidding system, in which it would purchase alcohol from distribu-
tors offering the lowest prices, even if the alcohol came from another state."t 6
North Dakota's statute thus imposed additional hurdles on out-of-state enti-
ties competing for the DOD's bid. Several distilleries and importers,
complaining of this burden, refused to sell to the military bases and threat-
ened to increase their prices. 07 In response, the federal government filed
suit, arguing that the North Dakota statute attempted to regulate the federal
government in violation of the Supremacy Clause as well as that the statute
was preempted by federal law. 10 8
In a plurality opinion, the North Dakota Court pronounced three rulings.
First, the Court reasoned that there was a significant risk that alcohol sold
directly to the bases might enter the regular consumers' market and disrupt
North Dakota's three-tier system."° For this reason, the Court found North
Dakota's labeling and reporting requirements presumptively valid."' Se-
cond, the Court determined that the North Dakota laws did not violate the
Supremacy Clause because they did not directly interfere with the federal
government or discriminate against it. 1"' Finally, the Court found no
preemption by federal law that would immunize the federal government
from the challenged North Dakota laws."'
North Dakota did not invite a dormant Commerce Clause inquiry. In-
stead, it dealt with two issues separate from the dormant Commerce
Clause's limitation on the Twenty-First Amendment: whether a state had the
power to pass an alcohol law that burdened the federal government,' and
whether federal alcohol laws preempted North Dakota's own alcohol
laws. 14 In the context of these issues, the Court stated-in dictum, as in
Granholm-that the three-tier system was "unquestionably legitimate.' '
15
The North Dakota plurality went no further in explaining or demonstrating
through constitutional analysis why it found the three-tier system
105. Id. at 426-27.
106. Id. at 427.
107. Id. at 429.
108. Id. at 434.
109. Id. at 432-33.
110. Id.
11l. Id. at 436-38.
112. Id. at 441.
113. Id. at 434-39.
114. Id. at 439-43.
115. Justice Stevens addressed North Dakota's three-tier system as follows:
The two North Dakota regulations fall within the core of the State's power under the
Twenty-first Amendment. In the interest of promoting temperance, ensuring orderly mar-
ket conditions, and raising revenue, the State has established a comprehensive system for




legitimate.)1 6 And though it endorsed the system under the Twenty-First
Amendment, it did not mention the dormant Commerce Clause in its en-
dorsement. 7 This exclusion makes sense: the dormant Commerce Clause
was not implicated in North Dakota, so the Court had no reason to explain
its interaction with Section Two of the Twenty-First Amendment.
The Supreme Court's application of the North Dakota dictum to its deci-
sion in Granholm, as well as lower courts' invocation of the dictum to
retailer challenges, is suspect. North Dakota has little relevance to the
dormant Commerce Clause challenge that the Court heard in Granholm. Yet
the Granholm Court cited both North Dakota's plurality opinion and Justice
Scalia's concurrence for the assertion that the three-tier system was "un-
questionably legitimate.""' 8 Because the plurality and Justice Scalia came to
that conclusion in a case that did not implicate the dormant Commerce
Clause,"19 its applicability to retailers' three-tier system challenges is dubi-
ous. 2 But its effect is not. The three-tier system is treated as sacrosanct
because of one sentence, often repeated, that originated in a case that did not
consider the dormant Commerce Clause's limitation on state alcohol laws.
B. Abrogated Law Underlying the North Dakota Dictum
North Dakota v. United States dealt with issues separate from the
dormant Commerce Clause questions in Granholm and subsequent retailer
challenges. Moreover, the very cases North Dakota cited in support of the
three-tier system's "unquestionable legitimacy" 121 were abrogated by
Granholm's holding.
The North Dakota Court cited Carter v. Virginia' and State Board of
Equalization v. Young's Market Co.' in support of the three-tier system's
constitutionality. Neither case is good law post-Granholm. In Carter, the
Court heard Commerce Clause challenges to various regulations in Virgin-
ia's Alcoholic Beverage Control Act that controlled the transportation of
116. See id. at 432-33.
117. See id.
118. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460,489 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
North Dakota v. United States, Justice Scalia wrote, "The Twenty-first Amendment ... em-
powers North Dakota to require that all liquor sold for use in the State be purchased from a
licensed in-state wholesaler. Nothing in our Twenty-first Amendment case law forecloses that
conclusion." 495 U.S. at 447 (Scalia, J., concurring).
119. See North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 434.
120. In Bainbridge v. Turner, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit analyzed case
law taking up the "core concern[s]" of the Twenty-First Amendment. 311 F.3d 1104, 1113
(1 lth Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court noted that North Dakota-
specifically the "unquestionably legitimate" language--offered a "single sentence" from the
Supreme Court on an otherwise unaddressed issue, and did so in the context of an "intergov-
ernmental immunity case." Id. at 1113-14.
121. See North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432.
122. 321 U.S. 131 (1944).
123. 299 U.S. 59 (1936), abrogated by Granholm, 544 U.S. 460.
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alcohol through the state.1 24 The Court recognized the tension between the
Twenty-First Amendment and the Commerce Clause, "a grant of power to
Congress to control commerce and ... a diminution pro tanto of absolute
state sovereignty over the same subject matter."' 2 It resolved this tension by
finding that the Twenty-First Amendment relieved the states of their usual
Commerce Clause obligations.2 6 Under this reasoning, the Court upheld the
regulations against dormant Commerce Clause challenges.2 7
In Young's Market, California wholesalers challenged a regulation that
required them to obtain an importer's license to sell beer produced in other
states. 2 The Court recognized that such a regulation would have been
struck down prior to the Twenty-First Amendment because it placed a bur-
den on interstate commerce.' 29 But because of the Twenty-First Amendment,
the Commerce Clause challenge was powerless in this case. 3 ' The Court
upheld the California regulations.''
In the wake of Granholm, neither Carter nor Young's Market has force.
Carter maintained that the Twenty-First Amendment trumped any Com-
merce Clause challenges by limiting the Clause's power over states in the
context of state alcohol laws. 32 Yet in Granholm the Supreme Court specifi-
cally held that the dormant Commerce Clause limited state regulation of
alcohol.'33 Young's Market reasoned that the Twenty-First Amendment au-
thorized state regulations burdening interstate commerce. 14 But the
Granholm Court explicitly repudiated this reasoning in Young's Market be-
cause it was "inconsistent" with the Court's view that the Twenty-First
Amendment did not authorize states to pass nonuniform laws in order to
discriminate against interstate commerce. 135 In fact, the Granholm Court
made clear that the Twenty-First Amendment did not "displace the rule that
States may not give a discriminatory preference to their own producers."'3 6
Because the Court in North Dakota relied on these shaky foundations, the
North Dakota dictum is unpersuasive and should be discarded.
124. Carter, 321 U.S. at 132-34.
125. Id. at 137.
126. Id. ("The [Twenty-First] Amendment has been held to relieve the states of the limi-
tations of the Commerce Clause on their powers over such transportation or importation."
(citing Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939), abrogated
by Granholm, 544 U.S. 460, and Young's Mkt., 299 U.S. 59)).
127. Id. at 137-38.
128. Young's Mkt., 299 U.S. at 60-61.
129. Id. at 62.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 64.
132. Carter, 321 U.S. at 137.
133. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 487-89 (2005) ("The instant cases, in contrast,
involve straightforward attempts to discriminate in favor of local producers. The discrimina-
tion is contrary to the Commerce Clause and is not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment.").
134. Young's Mkt., 299 U.S. 59.
135. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 484-86.
136. Id. at 486.
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C. The Fifth Circuit's Counterargument: A Caveat to Granholm
Assuming the North Dakota dictum was inappropriately applied in
Granholm, the Supreme Court still recognized-and arguably endorsed-
the idea that the three-tier system has been labeled "unquestionably legiti-
mate" by the courts. 137 In Wine Country, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that by
approving of the three-tier system in dictum, the Supreme Court included a
"caveat" to its conclusion that the dormant Commerce Clause presents a
limitation on states' alcohol regulations. 138 In fact, the Fifth Circuit went so
far as to recognize that the Twenty-First Amendment authorizes discrimina-
tory alcohol regulations that are incidental to the regulations of the three-tier
system. 39 Though such a reading of Granholm and the North Dakota dic-
tum offers a resolution to their fundamental tension, nowhere in Granholm
did the Supreme Court assert a caveat to its rule. Rather, the Court recited a
general rule that regulations dealing with in-state and out-of-state alcohol
must be "evenhanded."' 140 Moreover, the Court explicitly held that the chal-
lenged New York and Michigan laws were discriminatory, and thus
"contrary to the Commerce Clause and ... not saved by the Twenty-first
Amendment."'' It is difficult to read Granholm as providing a caveat to its
equal treatment rule in light of this holding and the Court's abrogation of
Young's Market.
Moreover, the Court offered no guidance on how one could follow both
Granholm's mandate and the contradictory North Dakota dictum. A central
tenet of Granholm is the standard of review it establishes: a state's alcohol
regulation, once declared discriminatory, will be deemed constitutional only
if the state shows through concrete evidence that the regulation "advances a
legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives." '42 By invoking Granholm's North Dakota
dictum, several courts have been able to sidestep this judicial review and
avoid examining whether state alcohol regulations are legally and economi-
cally justified. 143 As the Eastern District of Michigan recognized in Siesta
137. Id. at 489 ("We have previously recognized that the three-tier system itself is 'un-
questionably legitimate.'" (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990)
(plurality opinion)).
138. Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809, 818-19 (5th Cir. 2010)
("The legitimizing [of the three-tier system] is thus a caveat to the statement that the Com-
merce Clause is violated if state law authorizes 'differential treatment of in-state and out-of-
state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.'" (quoting Granholm,
544 U.S. at 472)), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011).
139. The Fifth Circuit clarified that the laws of the three-tier system are discriminatory
yet constitutional; thus, "[t]he discrimination that would be questionable ... is that which is
not inherent in the three-tier system itself." Id. at 818.
140. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 493.
141. Id. at489.
142. Id. at 489, 492-93 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278
(1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. See Wine Country, 612 F.3d at 818-19; Arnold's Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185,
190-91 (2d Cir. 2009) ("[The retailers' challenge] is a frontal attack on the constitutionality of
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Village, Granholm's essential mandate of evenhanded, nondiscriminatory
alcohol regulations and its endorsement of the three-tier system are inher-
ently contradictory. 144
The better reading of Granholm recognizes that the Supreme Court re-
cited the North Dakota dictum in an ill-considered fashion. North Dakota
had no place in Granholm's analysis, first, because North Dakota was a Su-
premacy Clause case-not a dormant Commerce Clause case-and, second,
because North Dakota relied on law that had no precedential force. For this
reason, the dictum should be discarded. Still, the Supreme Court included
the dictum for a reason. The Court likely wanted to save from constitutional
scrutiny a system that has been in place for nearly eighty years and in which
many states have asserted a strong interest. So it grasped at North Dakota's
unsupportable proposition to grant the system immunity. In light of the pre-
carious origins of the North Dakota dictum, this Note asserts that should the
Court decide to preserve the system's constitutionality, it ought to do so
through the analysis set out in Granholm, and not by bare reliance on the ill-
suited dictum from North Dakota.
III. DISCARDING THE DICTUM: HEIGHTENED
JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER GRANHOLM
If the North Dakota dictum were discarded, courts hearing Commerce
Clause challenges to the three-tier system would have to perform the judicial
review mandated in Granholm. Recent decisions regarding the three-tier
system illustrate the arguments that states would likely make to justify the
system. And the outcomes in these decisions suggest that states' arguments
would fall short of the heavy burden Granholm requires. Section III.A out-
lines the two standards of review in dormant Commerce Clause challenges.
Section III.B finds that strict scrutiny should apply to retailer challenges to
the three-tier system. Finally, Section III.C reviews recent state defenses
of the three-tier system and concludes that, under strict scrutiny and with-
out the protection of the North Dakota dictum, the three-tier system would
likely be struck down as unconstitutional.
A. Two Dormant Commerce Clause Tests
Courts employ one of two levels of analysis when evaluating a state al-
cohol regulation under a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.1 45 If the
the three-tier system itself.... Appellants' argument is therefore directly foreclosed by the
Granholm Court's express affirmation of the legality of the three-tier system."); Brooks v.
Vassar, 462 F.3d 341, 352 (4th Cir. 2006).
144. See Siesta Viii. Mkt., LLC v. Granholm, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1039 (E.D. Mich.
2008) (noting that while the Granholm Court considered the three-tier system an "appropriate
use of state power," the Court "did not approve of a system that discriminates against out-of-
state interests").
145. Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Gregory P. Luib, Moving Sideways: Post-Granholm De-
velopments in Wine Direct Shipping and Their Implications for Competition, 75 ANTITRUST
L.J. 505, 524-28 (2008).
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alcohol regulation is evenhanded and presents only an incidental burden on
interstate commerce, then a court applies a deferential test known as the
Pike test.'46 Under Pike, a court upholds the challenged regulation unless
"the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits." 47
On the other hand, if a court finds that a state alcohol regulation discrim-
inates against interstate commerce, the court applies strict scrutiny.1 48 Courts
find discrimination when a state law "mandate[s] 'differential treatment of
in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and bur-
dens the latter.' ,,149 If a court determines that a law is discriminatory, then
the court must strike the law down unless it advances a legitimate local pur-
pose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory
alternatives. 150 Legitimate local purposes have included promoting temper-
ance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising revenue.' 5 ' Courts
have also approved local-option laws to allow localities to be dry and to pre-
vent underage drinking.' To successfully defend a discriminatory alcohol
regulation, a state must also provide concrete evidence that nondiscriminato-
ry alternatives are unworkable.' 53 In practice, this burden on states is a heavy
one. 154
B. Strict Scrutiny Should Be Applied to the Three-Tier System
If courts discarded the North Dakota dictum, then they would have to
apply one of the two dormant Commerce Clause tests to the three-tier sys-
tem. The strict scrutiny review prescribed in Granholm is the appropriate
standard of review. This Note supports this assertion in three ways: first, by
146. Id. at 526.
147. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
148. Ohlhausen & Luib, supra note 145, at 524-25; see also Granholm v. Heald, 544
U.S. 460, 476 (2005) ("State laws that discriminate against interstate commerce face 'a virtu-
ally per se rule of invalidity.'" (quoting City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624
(1978))),
149. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472 (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality,
511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).
150. Id. at 489.
151. North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990) (plurality opinion).
152. See, e.g., Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Hudgins, 488 F. Supp. 2d 601, 619-22
(W.D. Ky. 2006), aff'd, 553 F3d 423 (6th Cir. 2008).
153. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492-93.
154. Id. at 490 ("Under our precedents, which require the 'clearest showing' to justify
discriminatory state regulation, [the states' unsupported assertions that their laws would pre-
vent minors from accessing alcohol and facilitate tax collection are] not enough." (citing C &
A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994))); see also Anheuser-Busch,
Inc, v. Schnorf, 738 F. Supp. 2d 793, 808 (N.D. Ill. 2010) ("Satisfying this standard is no easy
feat."); Siesta Vill. Mkt., LLC v. Granholm, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1041 (E.D. Mich. 2008)
(recognizing that Granholm requires a state to show concrete evidence, rather than sweeping
assertions, to justify the challenged regulation); Ohlhausen & Luib, supra note 145, at 524-25
(illustrating that Granholm imposes a high standard on the state).
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reviewing the case law declaring laws that impose economic burdens on
out-of-state entities unconstitutional; second, by contrasting the retailers'
challenges with challenges to state satellite taxes, which do not contain an
explicit physical presence requirement; and third, by recognizing the broad
scope of Granholm's mandate, which the Second Circuit neglected in its
Arnold's Wines decision.
1. Strict Scrutiny Applies
The three-tier system necessarily excludes out-of-state retailers and
wholesalers unless they open an in-state location and obtain the necessary
license to operate within the state.'55 Such a scheme is discriminatory under
the definition provided in Granholm.1'56 Moreover, the court in Siesta Village
noted that courts are particularly suspicious of regulations that require "an
entity to maintain residency in the home state 'in order to compete on equal
terms' with in-state businesses."'57 In Siesta Village, the court applied strict
scrutiny to Michigan's three-tier system because it discriminated against
out-of-state retailers by placing an extra burden on them.'58 Because each
state's three-tier system operates in a similarly localized fashion, the system
as it exists in each state imposes this extra burden on out-of-state partici-
pants. "
Courts hearing challenges to the three-tier system should apply strict
scrutiny rather than the more deferential Pike test. Pike would apply if a
court found that the three-tier system's physical presence requirement were
not discriminatory. But the Granholm Court cited numerous decisions for
the proposition that when a law requires an out-of-state business to establish
an in-state location in order to compete in that state's market, the law is fa-
cially or patently discriminatory and triggers strict scrutiny. 6 ' In other
155. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
156. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472 ("The mere fact of nonresidence should not foreclose a
producer in one State from access to markets in other States'" (citing H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc.
v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949))); id. at 475 ("New York's in-state presence require-
ment runs contrary to our admonition that States cannot require an out-of-state firm 'to
become a resident in order to compete on equal terms.'" (quoting Halliburton Oil Well Ce-
menting Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 72 (1963))).
157. Siesta Vill., 596 F. Supp. 2d at 1039-40 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (citing Granholm, 544
U.S. at 475, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970), and Halliburton Oil Well
Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 72 (1963), for this proposition); see also Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970) ("[T]he Court has viewed with particular suspicion
state statutes requiring business operations to be performed in the home State that could more
efficiently be performed elsewhere. Even where the State is pursuing a clearly legitimate local
interest, this particular burden on commerce has been declared to be virtually per se illegal.").
158. Siesta Vill., 596 F. Supp. 2d at 1040 ("[T]he added burden of opening a new loca-
tion in Michigan is differential and discriminatory treatment of out-of-state interests.").
159. See supra Section I.A.
160. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472-76 (citing Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily,
373 U.S. 64, 72 (1963); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 526, 539 (1949); and
Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1871)). Granholm cites other cases, too, for the
broader proposition that the Court tends to strike down state alcohol statutes whose effects
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circumstances, the Court has closely scrutinized similar laws because they
advantage local interests and disadvantage out-of-state businesses. For exam-
ple, the Court has applied strict scrutiny where a New Jersey law prohibited
other municipalities from importing waste into the state to dispose of it,'
where a Hawaii tax exemption for alcohol produced in the state was intended
to and did promote economic protectionism, 162 and where a Massachusetts tax
assessed on all milk products entering the state benefitted only in-state dairy
farmers.' 63 The three-tier system, and more specifically its physical presence
requirement, falls into this category of facially discriminatory laws.
2. Challenges to the Satellite Tax: A Helpful Analogy
Another recent line of dormant Commerce Clause cases informs the
analysis of the appropriate standard of review in challenges to the three-tier
system. DIRECTV and other satellite broadcasting companies brought sev-
eral unsuccessful state court challenges to "satellite taxes," which are
imposed on satellite companies but not on cable companies.16 The satellite
companies contended that satellite taxes discriminate against interstate
commerce because they favor the cable companies that employ state citizens
and whose services involve in-state equipment. 165 They claimed that these
taxes penalize satellite companies for not making as large an economic in-
vestment in a state, 66 since satellite companies can deliver their services
without a physical presence in a state. 167 Every federal and state court that
has heard these cases has upheld the satellite tax. 68
The decisions rejecting these dormant Commerce Clause challenges
align on several key points that expose why courts hold that the satellite tax
is constitutional and, by extension, why courts should not find the three-tier
system constitutional. First, courts find that cable companies are not obvi-
advantage the economic interests of the state over the economic interests of other states. Id. at
487-88 (citing Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986); and Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263
(1984)).
161. See City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
162. See Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984). The Bacchus Court stated
that a finding of economic protectionism could be made based on the purpose or the effect of a
state law. Id. at 270.
163. See W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 202 (1994) ("For over 150
years, our cases have rightly concluded that the imposition of a differential burden on any part
of the stream of commerce-from wholesaler to retailer to consumer-is invalid, because a
burden placed at any point will result in a disadvantage to the out-of-state producer.").
164. E.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2007); DIRECTV, Inc. v.
State, 632 S.E.2d 543 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Levin, 941 N.E.2d 1187 (Ohio
2010); see also Litigation Update, STOP SATELLITE TAX Now!, http://stopsatellitetax.
com/litigation-update.php (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
165. Treesh, 487 F.3d at 476; Levin, 941 N.E.2d at 1192.
166. Treesh, 487 F.3d at 476.
167. Levin, 941 N.E.2d at 1192.
168. Id. at 1194.
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ously local compared to satellite companies. 169 Second, courts reason that
cable companies and satellite companies provide their customers different
goods. 170 Finally, and most relevant to the retailer challenges to the three-tier
system, courts conclude that the differential tax treatment of satellite com-
panies vis-a-vis cable companies is attributable to the distinct natures of the
two types of broadcasting services and not to geographic location. 171 As the
Supreme Court of Ohio explained, "the sale of satellite broadcasting ser-
vices is subject to tax regardless of whether the provider is an in-state or
out-of-state business and without considering the amount of local economic
activity or investment ... that the satellite companies bring to Ohio. 1 72 Be-
cause these laws proscribe differential treatment due not to physical
presence or absence but rather to the varying modes of service, courts find
no dormant Commerce Clause violations in satellite taxes.
These satellite tax cases are instructive because they reveal the factors
courts look to in determining whether a state law has an impermissible
physical presence requirement. Applying the reasoning of these cases to the
three-tier system cuts in favor of finding discriminatory physical presence
requirements in three-tier system's laws. Unlike the satellite taxes, the three-
tier system clearly distinguishes between in-state wholesalers and retailers
and their out-of-state counterparts. 173 Further, these discrete sets of entities
both sell the same goods-alcoholic beverages-and offer the same modes
of service, distribution, and retail sales. Finally, and most importantly, the
satellite tax cases differ from retailer challenges to the three-tier system
because the three-tier system's laws distinguish between in-state and out-
of-state entities based on the location of their operations. The moment an
out-of-state retailer establishes a brick-and-mortar store in a state, the re-
tailer can obtain a license and begin selling alcohol as a member of the
state's three-tier system. 74 Because the system requires a physical presence
169. E.g., id. at 1196 (finding that both cable and satellite companies are interstate enti-
ties); DIRECTV, Inc. v. State, 632 S.E.2d at 548 ("[Cable and satellite companies] both utilize
in-state and out-of-state equipment and facilities in providing service to North Carolina sub-
scribers and both own property within the State of North Carolina.").
170. Treesh, 487 F.3d at 480 (finding that cable and satellite companies sell different
goods because they provide different types of broadcasting); Levin, 941 N.E.2d at 1195 (rec-
ognizing distinct technological modes of broadcast in cable and satellite services).
171. Treesh, 487 F.3d at 481; DIRECTV, Inc. v. State, 632 S.E.2d at 547 (finding that the
satellite law "does not make any geographical distinctions"); Levin, 941 N.E.2d at 1195.
172. Levin, 941 N.E.2d at 1195. I intentionally gloss over the argument that Ohio's dis-
tinction between satellite and cable company modes of service may be a proxy for excluding
out-of-state businesses in a manner that the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine should still
find offensive. This argument is persuasive, and DIRECTV cited authorities propounding this
argument in its petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
15-19, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Levin, No. 10-1322 (Apr. 27, 2011), 2011 WL 1594681, at *15-19.
Because the three-tier system contains explicit physical presence requirements, an analysis of
the proxy theory of discrimination is not crucial to this Note's argument.
173. See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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in the state, the system discriminates against interstate commerce and
should receive strict scrutiny.
3. Arnold's Wines: A Misguided Analysis
In Arnold's Wines, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit resisted
analysis of the physical presence requirement contained in New York's
three-tier system. After determining that the North Dakota dictum fore-
closed judicial review of New York's three-tier system, the Second Circuit
offered an alternative argument for finding that the three-tier system was in
accordance with Granholm's equal treatment rule. Because "New York re-
quires that all liquor-whether originating in state or out of state-pass
through the three-tier system, ' the Second Circuit found that the system
adheres to the dormant Commerce Clause. In other words, since New York's
regulations controlled both in-state and out-of-state alcohol, the system had
no discriminatory effect.
The Second Circuit's reasoning in Arnold's Wines is flawed for two rea-
sons. First, the argument is facile. It proves nondiscrimination simply by
rejecting the notion that a single law applied to two sets of entities could
illegally burden one set of entities and not the other. Yet courts recognize
disparate impact in state laws that facially apply in an equal fashion to in-
state and out-of-state goods. For example, similar reasoning did not save
New Jersey's law banning trash collected outside the state from entering its
landfill space, even though the law controlled New Jersey trash and trash
from the city of Philadelphia. 176 Likewise, this reasoning failed to justify a
Massachusetts law that taxed all milk dealers operating in the state but pro-
vided a share of the fund created by the tax only to Massachusetts milk
producers.177 Granholm struck down laws that discriminated in favor of lo-
cal participants in the alcohol industry and disadvantaged their out-of-state
counterparts. 78 A law does not pass Granholm's equal treatment test just
because all alcohol in the market is subject to it. Rather, Granholm and the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine prohibit differential treatment of in-
state and out-of-state market participants. 17 9
Nor does a law pass Granholm's test merely because all producers in the
first tier are subject to the system. The Second Circuit made its second mis-
take in limiting the scope of Granholm's mandate to alcohol products and
producers. 8 " Granholm's language exposes the holding's universal scope;
the Court expressed disfavor with laws that "mandate 'differential treatment
175. Arnold's Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2009).
176. See City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
177. See W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
178. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 473-74 (2005).
179. See supra notes 160-163.
180. See Arnold's Wines, 571 F.3d at 191 ("Because New York's three-tier system treats
in-state and out-of-state liquor the same, and does not discriminate against out-of-state prod-
ucts or producers, we need not analyze the regulation further under Commerce Clause
principles.").
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of in-state and out-of-state economic interests.' "81 The Granholm Court
spoke in terms of alcohol products and producers because the subjects of the
New York and Michigan cases were laws regulating wineries. 8 2 But the rule
enunciated in Granholm could not apply solely to products and producers
because the goal of the dormant Commerce Clause is, as Granholm makes
clear, avoiding the "economic Balkanization that had plagued relations
among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Con-
federation."' 8 3 At each tier, the three-tier system affects both in-state and
out-of-state participants. An alcohol regulation that treats in-state and out-
of-state wholesalers or retailers differently produces the same illegal burden
on interstate commerce as did the laws in Granholm.14
C. The Three-Tier System Fails under Strict Scrutiny
Once a court determines that the three-tier system discriminates against
interstate commerce, it will uphold the system only if the state demonstrates
that the system furthers legitimate local purposes and produces concrete
evidence that other nondiscriminatory alternatives are insufficient. 8 5 In oth-
er words, the state must prove "the need for discrimination."'
18 6
Examining recent state arguments defending laws that are part of the
three-tier system makes clear that states have not produced compelling ar-
guments to justify the system's discriminatory aspects. This Note focuses on
two cases, Siesta Village Market, LLC v. Granholm and Anheuser-Busch,
Inc. v. Schnorf, because they reveal the sorts of arguments states would
make in support of the three-tier system.
In Siesta Village, the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
applied strict scrutiny to Michigan's three-tier system and found Michigan's
181. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472 (emphasis added) (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't
of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)); see also Siesta Vill. Mkt., LLC. v. Granholm, 596
F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1039 (E.D. Mich. 2008) ("[Granholm] did not approve of a system that
discriminates against out-of-state interests."); Andre Nance, Note, Don't Put a Cork in
Granholm v. Heald: New York's Ban on Interstate Direct Shipments of Wine Is Unconstitution-
al, 16 J.L. & POL'Y 925, 946-47 (2008) (arguing that Granholm's concern was with broader
economic protectionism and implicates all tiers of the three-tier system).
182. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 465.
183. Id. at 472 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
184. The Siesta Village court illustrated this burden:
The only way for an out-of-state retailer to obtain such a license and ship directly to con-
sumers in Michigan is to maintain a location in the state. This requirement is burdensome
on out-of-state retailers because there are many costs associated with opening a new lo-
cation in Michigan that may not be viable for retailers like Siesta Village. As noted in
[Granholm], the expense of establishing a bricks-and-mortar operation in one state, let
alone in all 50 states, is prohibitive. In-state retailers, on the other hand, have open access
to the Michigan market at no additional cost.
596 F. Supp. 2d at 1040 (citation omitted).
185. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489, 492.
186. Id. at 493.
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justifications insufficient. 8 7 Michigan argued that it could not efficiently
enforce its tax and labeling laws if out-of-state retailers were granted access
to a state market. 88 But, the Michigan court objected, this argument was
nearly identical to New York's and Michigan's arguments that had failed in
Granholm.189 Further, Michigan did not explain why self-reporting and
submission of sales reports, which the Granholm Court deemed a sufficient
nondiscriminatory alternative, would not remedy difficulties in enforcing tax
laws against out-of-state retailers. 90 Finally, the state raised the concern that
it could not ensure compliance with its underage drinking laws but failed to
show why an adult signature requirement, which applies to wineries' direct
shipments, could not also apply to retailers' direct shipments.' 9'
Another recent decision, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schnorf,192 provides
further proof that states are unable to justify the three-tier system under
strict scrutiny. In Schnorf, the District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois struck down a regulation that permitted in-state brewers to obtain a
wholesaler's license but prohibited out-of-state breweries from doing the
same. 93 The court cited Granholm for the proposition that a law discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce if "by its own terms it regulates
disparately out-of-state and in-state economic interests and favors the in-
state interests."' 194 It went on to find the Illinois regulation discriminatory
because it restricted out-of-state breweries from selling their products on
equal terms with their in-state counterparts. 195
In Schnorf, Illinois offered the same arguments that New York and Mich-
igan had offered in Granholm, and again the court rejected them. 96 The
state argued that allowing large, out-of-state breweries to compete as whole-
salers in the Illinois market would frustrate its goal of promoting
187. Siesta Viii., 596 F. Supp. 2d at 1040-44.
188. The court described Michigan's argument as follows:
IT]he State is constantly checking on Michigan wholesalers to make sure they are com-
plying with state law. Out-of-state retailers like Siesta Village purchase their wine from
non-Michigan retailers [sic]. Consequently, when they sell it to Michigan consumers, the
State will not be able to regulate these sales because they will not go through the im-




191. Id. at 1043.
192. 738 F. Supp. 2d 793 (N.D. 11. 2010).
193. Schnorf, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 817.
194. Id. at 803.
195. Id. at 808.
196. Id. at 809-10 ("[T]he arguments that Defendants present are similar, if not identi-
cal, to those that have been presented and rejected in other alcohol beverage discrimination
cases."). The Schnorf court cited Granholm as well as other three-tier system cases in support
of this assertion, including Action Wholesalers Liquors v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Laws
Enforcement Commission, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (W.D. Okla. 2006), and Costco Wholesale
Corp. v. Hoen, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (W.D. Wash. 2005). 738 F. Supp. 2d at 809.
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temperance and competition. Second, Illinois asserted an argument that its
regulation promoted tax collection and reduced the risk of tax evasion.'97
But these arguments had several flaws. The court noted that Illinois
failed to explain why allowing in-state breweries to operate as wholesalers
promoted temperance.1 98 Moreover, Illinois offered no explanation for why
nondiscriminatory alternatives would not also promote temperance. 199 Final-
ly, the court rejected the tax-related claims because Illinois provided no
concrete evidence of its assertions and did not explain why nondiscriminato-
ry laws would not achieve the same goals.2°°
These responses by the courts in the Eastern District of Michigan and
the Northern District of Illinois recognize the realities of today's market-
place. For example, direct shipment schemes do not inhibit state taxation
because companies have developed methods to permit direct shipment while
still collecting state taxes. 20 1 Though studies posit the "possibility" of tax
collection problems under a direct shipment scheme, no state that allows
wineries to ship their products directly has reported tax leakage. 20 2 Direct
shipment, then, does not prevent the states from monitoring and taxing alco-
hol as it enters the state by a nontraditional route. Granted, this is the kind of
policy debate that Justice Stevens criticized in his Granholm dissent."3 But
in light of the dormant Commerce Clause limitations on state laws passed
pursuant to the Twenty-First Amendment, this is just the kind of policy
review that the Constitution requires courts to take up: Is the state's discrim-
ination needed?2°
Siesta Village and Schnorf suggest the types of recycled arguments states
would make in defense of the three-tier system. Extrapolating from these
two cases, courts applying strict scrutiny would likely find that states' justi-
fications for the discriminatory three-tier scheme are inadequate. It would be
prudent for states to begin considering alternative regulatory schemes that
would assure an orderly market, promote temperance and the collection of
197. Schnorf, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 809.
198. Id. at 810.
199. Id. at 809-10 ("[E]ven if the need to promote temperance and competition were
advanced by barring all out-of-state brewers from distributing beer, the argument would fail
because Defendants do not attempt to prove that non-discriminatory means would be unwork-
able to accomplish the State's objectives.").
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., Sales Tax Requirements, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.con/gp/help/
customer/display.html?nodeld=468512 (last visited Nov. 11, 2011) (outlining Amazon.com's
procedures for collecting state taxes on direct shipment purchases and transferring them to the
states). Post-Granholm, many states now allow out-of-state wineries to ship directly to con-
sumers, and the states collect taxes on these sales. PETER FRANCHOT, COMPTROLLER OF MD.,
DIRECT WINE SHIPMENT REPORT 33-34 (2010)
202. FRANCHOT, supra note 201, at 33.
203. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 494 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Today
many Americans, particularly those members of the younger generations who make policy
decisions, regard alcohol as an ordinary article of commerce ... .
204. Id. at 493.
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state taxes, and deter underage drinking, while allowing out-of-state retailers
to ship their products directly to consumers. Indeed, the Granholm Court
offered several suggestions to New York and Michigan, whose alcohol laws
it deemed discriminatory: evenhanded permit requirements for wineries
wanting to engage in direct shipping, electronic background checks and self-
reporting, regular submission of sales reports, adult signatures for alcohol
deliveries, and increased reliance on federal licensing laws to encourage
participants in the market to obey state regulations. 20 5 These same sugges-
tions could be implemented in a scheme that allowed out-of-state retailers to
participate in a state's alcoholic beverage market.
CONCLUSION
Granholm stands for two important propositions. First, the Twenty-First
Amendment does not shield states from dormant Commerce Clause limita-
tions in the alcohol context. Second, courts should subject discriminatory
alcohol laws to strict scrutiny. Rather than blindly repeating the inapposite
North Dakota dictum, courts should open up the three-tier system to judicial
review. Under strict scrutiny, the three-tier system would likely fall, and
states would have to correct the discriminatory aspects of the system. It
would behoove state legislatures to develop new regulatory schemes that
comply with the dormant Commerce Clause and Granholm's equal treat-
ment rule. Though it may seem a drastic course to dismantle a system that
has been in place for seventy-five years, the Constitution mandates such a
result.
Our country twice experimented on a large scale with alcohol regulation.
The first experiment, Prohibition, has been largely condemned. The second,
its repeal, gave birth to the three-tier system. But in effect, the three-tier sys-
tem has resulted in another prohibition-a prohibition on efficient direct
shipment and online sales of consumer goods that are mainstays of our
economy. In the wake of Granholm, courts should subject this outdated and
discriminatory scheme to more searching judicial review.
205. Id. at 490-92.
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